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ABSTRACT
This paper studies optimal fiscal policy in an economy where
heterogeneous agents with uncertain lifetimes coexist. We show that
some plausible social welfare functions lead to time—inconsistent opti-
mal plans, and we suggest restrictions on social preferences that
avoid the problem. The normative prescriptions of a time—consistent
utilitarian planner generalize the 'two—part Golden Rule" suggested
by Samuelson, and imply aggregate dynamics similar to those arising
in the Cass—Koopmans—Ramsey optimal growth framework. We characterize
lump—sum transfer schemes that allow the optimal allocation to be
decentralized as the competitive equilibrium of an economy with
actuarially fair annuities. The lump—sum transfers that accomplish
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This paper studies the idea ofoptimalfiscal policy in an economy
riareh'eterogenousgenerations with uncertain lifetimes coexistS A
groinq iterature studies the effects of SQCjCl security and government
debt issue ineconomiesofthistype, but it stops short of describing
;rvintartemporalsocial welfare function that might justify the use of
ficaltool;.Our primary concern is therefore the dynamic resource
allocation chosen by a utilitarian planner who weighsthewelfare of
bothexisting and futuregenerations. The basicmodelof the individual
comesfrom Yaari (196S).
Specificationof anintertemporalsocialwelfare functionis
compilcatedby the possibility that optimal plans are dynamically incon-
sistent in tne sense of Strotz (1956). This possibility arises in any
modelwith overlapping generations.Belowweshowthat sonic plausible
social welfare functions lead to time—inconsistency1 and suggest
restrictions onsocial preferencesthat avoid the problem.
Wearegrateful for helpful discussions withAndrew Abel.Financial
supportwasprovided by the National Science Foundati on and the
AlfredP.Sloan Foundation.
Forrecant applications of uncertain—lifetime models to fiscal—
oo1icyquestions, see Abel (1985. Blanchard c1925)1andEck'stein,
Eichenbaum, and Pci ed (1983) among others. Open—economy aspects of
BIanchards (1985) model are studied by Buiter(1934)1Frenkel and
Razin c1984) • and Giovannini (1984). Early applications of 'i'aari s
(1965)setup include Merton (1971)and Tobin (1967).An intertecnporal welfare aflaiysisalonqthe lines of that
presented here has beenveinped by Samuelson (1967, 1968) in the
corite<t of Diamond's (1965)deterministicoverlappinq—qe'erations model
with capital. However, special assumptions made by amuelson obscure
the potential for time incons:stency. It is therefore noteworthy that
the normative prescriptions o our time—consistent utilitarian planner
generalize those suggested by Samuelson. Moreover, the aggregate
dynamics implied by an optimal plan are qualitatively similar to those
crivihy r:cIi) knnrn;nc(19A>, ndRmsy H97P)inrnndc
withidentical3 non—overlapping generations. We characterize lump—sun
transfer scheme; that allow the optimal allocation to be decentralized
through a competitive economy with actuarially fair annuities.
An important finding of the paper is that the above—mentioned
transfers are in general age dependent. It follows that the aggregative
fiscal policies studied in the recent literature will usually fail to
achieve the optimal allocation. If first—best fiscal policy tools are
unavailableq however, the door is opened to the type of general—
equilibrium time inconsistency studied by Kydland and Prescott (1977>,
Calvo (1978), and others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the
individual's problem and the competitive equilibrium of an economy in
which there is no uncertainty at the aggregate level. Section II takes
up utilitarian planning and the time—consistency problem. In section III
the allocation chosen by a time—consistent utilitarian planner is
characterized. Section IV discusses lump—sum redistribution schemes that
Phelps and Riley (1978) study the Rawlsian 'maximin' case. Abel
(1984) uses .Sarnuelson's criterion to evaluate steady—state welfare
in overlaping—generations models with money.7
replicatethe planner'; preferred allocation as a competitive equl—
librium. SectionVis a brief summary of the result;.
1.C;ompetitive Equilibrium with Annuities
To make the paer self—contained, this section briefly reviews the
interteinporal alloctian problem of an individual with an uncertain
lifetime who purchases actuarially fair annuities. While the conclusions
merely repeat those of Yaari (1965), the presentation of the problem is
slightly different and hopefully more transparent. The section conclude;
by describing the economy's aqgregate dynamics in perfect—foresight
equilibrium.
An individual born at time v (his 'vintage) is uncertain about
the length N of hi; life. Let F(.) denote the cumulative distribution
function of the random variable N, so that F(n)ProbCN ￿ n). Of
course, F(O) =0and lieF(n) =1.Implicit in our notation is the
assumption that the distibution of N does not depend on vz in addition
FL)isassumed to be continuous and piecewise differentiable with an
associatedprobability density function +L) satisfying F(n> =SF(s)ds.
Individuals maximize the expected value over possible lifespan; of a
discounted integral of future instantaneous utilities. The time—t
utility of a vintage—v individual is a function u(.) of consumption
c(v,t).4 If denotes the constant subjective discount rate, expected
lifetime utility for an agent born on date v is
(1)U(v)Sf(n){SVu[c(v,t))expEt_vHdtHn.
The function u(.) is assumed to be bounded, strictly concave, and
twice continuously differentiable. Notice that u(.) is assumed to be
independent of v. Only consumption paths c(v,.) that are piecewise
continuous and right—hand differentiable are considered. To ensure
interior solutions, the usual Inada conditions are imposed.—4—
After integrating by parts, (1) can be written in trieform
(2)U(v)$u[c(v,t))E1
-F(t-v)3exp[-(t-v)3dt,
where 1 —F(t—v)is just the probability that an individual born on date
v is alive on date t.
Define p(n) to be the instantaneous death probability faced by an
individual ofage n:
(3.p(n) =4(n)/El—F(n)).
Because 4(n)= F'(n)and NO)= 0,(3) implies
.4)I —Fri) =exot—L.o(s)ds].
The objective function (2) therefore takes the form
(5)U(v) =uEc(v,t))exp{-StE+p(s-v)Jds)dt.
As in Yaari (1965), the possibility of death leads to a higher subjec-
tive discount rate on future utility.
Assume now, as in Blanchard's (1985) model, that a new cohort of
individuals is born each instant and that there is no aqgregate uncer-
tainty ever though each individual's lifespan is stochastic. If the size
ofeach newly—born cohort isnormalized to unity, there are exactly 1 —
F(t—v)individuals of vintage v alive at any time t ￿vand this
cohorts size declines at rate p(t—v). Those within a given cohort are
a;suied to be identical in all respects.
Individuals are prohibited from dying in debt, and can borrow only
if they simultaneously buy insurance against that contingency. There
existinsurance:ompanies that buy and issue annuities which pay holders
the age—dependent yield r(t) +p(t—v)at time t but expire in the event—5-.-
of theownersdeatr.Because there are no bequests, those with positive
nonhumanalth will chooseto hold it exclusively in the fora of an-
nuities, which pay a rateexceeding the sarket real interest rate while
theowner live;.Borrowerseffectively insure themselves against ac-
cidental death by issuing annuities to the insurance company. In short,
insurance companies intermediate between all borrowers and lenders and
also hold the private sectors net marketable assets, which in the
present context will coincide with the capital stock. Under the assump—
tions of the preceding paragraph, and with costless free entry into the
insurance industry, the insurance premium p(t—v) is actuarially fair and
the insurance company makes zero profits. The instantaneous effective
borrowing rate faced at time t by an individual born at time v is thus
r(t) +p(t—v),wherer(t) is the real interest rate and p(t—v) is the
actuarially fair insurance premium.
The lifetime problem of an individual born on date v may now be
statedas follows: choose a consumptionpathmc(v4t))so as to ma<i—
mize(5>subjectto
(6) c(v,t)exp{-ftEr(s)+p(s-v))ds}dta(vv).
In (6), a(v,t) is the overall time—t wealth of an agent of vintage v.
Wealth is the sum of of thepresentdiscounted value of wages (human
wealth, the present discounted value of expected future transfer pay-
ments from the government, and capital.
The Lagrangian for the problem can be written
L =iuEc(v,t)]expE-(t-v)3-pc(v,t)expt_itr(s)ds}expE_!tp(s_v>ds]dt,
It is easily verified that the solution to the individuals problem
istimeconsistent.—6—
whereis a Lagrange aultiplier. (Terms that do rotinvolvec(.,.> have
been disregarded.) Maxim:ation of L withrespectc(v,t) yields the
necessary condi tian
(7)u'Cc(vt)]exp[-(t-v)3 -exp[_Jtr(s)ds3 0,
for all t. Let D be the time—derivative operator. Differentiating (7)
with respect to time, we obtain
(8) Dcv,t =-u'Ec(v,t)]/u"[c(v,t)))Er(t)
-
Anoptical individual consumption plan obeys (8) while forcing the
budgat constraint (6) to bind. Note that the death probabilities do not
affect the time derivative of consumption along an optimal path (al-
though they do affect the level of consumption through (6>).
Turn next to the implied dynamic behavior of the economy's ag—
gregates in perfect—foresight equilibrium. If each agent is endowed with
one unIt of labor, the labor force at any time t is a constant,
f t
(s—v) ds]dv.
Aggregate output V cay then be written as a function Y(K)ofthe
economy's capital stock K.6 The usual one—sector assumptIon fixes the
consumption price of capital at unity. If C(t) denotes aggregate con—
sucnpti on,
(9)C(t) =5tc(v,t)expE_rtp(s_v)dsJdv
and if the government consumes no goods itself, the economy's capital
The underlying production function is assumed to be homogeneous of
degree one in capital and labor, to exhibit diminishing returns to
each factor, and to obey the Inada conditions.—7-
stock evolves according to
(10)DK(t)=Y[K(t)3 —C(t)
In perfect--foresight equilibrium, the expected real interest rate
r(t) must equal the marginal product of capital Y'(K(t)] for all t.
Combination of (B) and (9) shows that the time derivative of aggregate
consumption is
(11) DC(t) =c(t,t)-!tp(t_v)c(vt)expE_ftp(s_v)ds]dv
-{Y'[K(t)]_)ft Cu'tc(v,t) )/u[c(v!t) 3)expE-J'tp(s-v)ds)dv
in equilibrium. The first two terms on the right—hand side of (11) sum
to the difference between the consumption of the newly born and the
overall consumption of those who die at time t. The third term is just
the sum of the individual consumption changes dictated by the Euler
equation (B).
The steady state is defined by DCDK0. Without simplifying
assumptions, it is quite difficult to characterize the steady—state
allocation for this competitive economy. For example, if p(n) is a
constant p as in Merton (1971) and Blanchard (1985), and if u(c) =
(R> 0), then it is easy to see that the steady—state real
interest rate rc =y/(KL)must satisfy rC pR. (KL is the steady—
state capital stock in the competitive model when there is rio government
intervention.)
The system becomes quite simple under Blarichards (1985) addi-
tional assumptions that R =1(so that u(c) =log(c)) ,thatcohorts are
born without nonhuman wealth, and that all individuals of any age have
the same human wealth
(12) h(t) =Sw(s)expt—,fEr(z)+p]dz)ds,—8—
where w(t) is the real wageatt. When R 1, the consumption function
takes the form c(v,t) (+p)Ca(v,t)]. The (constant) population is just
l/p and becaise aggregate human wealth (t) therefore equals h(t)/p and
aggregate noniuman wealth equals the capital stock K(t)(11) becomes
(13) DC(t) =('+p>h(t)+{V'EK(t))——p}U'+p)EH(t)+K(t)]
{Y'[K(t))—E}C(t) —p(+p)K(t)
This simple characterization of the aggregate dynamics is
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oage. As we shall see later, differential taxation of this type is
needed to support optimal growth paths as competitive equilibria. We
next discuss the meaning of "optimality1 and the implied intertemporal
resource allocation for a centrally—planned economy.
II. Time—Consistent Utilitarian Planning
In this section we describe the objective function of a
utilitarian planner whose preferences admit time—consistent optimal
plans. The planner is utilitarian in the sense that his welfare objec-
tive is a weighted sum of the utilities ofallgenerations, including
those not yet born.
Samuelson (1967. 1968) ,buildingon a suggestion of Lerner (1959),
was the first to study utilitarian planning in an economy with finitely—
lived overlapping generations. In the model of Samuelson (1968), a
generation lives for two periods and a new generation is born each
period until a known date T in the future. Thus, the last generation is
born on date 1—1.. If an individual born on date t enjoys lifetime
utility uEc(t,t),c(t,t+1)J, Samuelson's planner maximizes
5(0) TIt[(tt) ,c(t,t+1H,—9—
subject to constraints discussed below, on date 0. The parameter
c(0,13 gives the rate at which the planner discounts future generations'
utility (wth 3 1the Ramsey case). lthouqh Saniuelson assumes a
finite horzon, he characterizes a hypothetical steady—state allocation
satisfying first—order conditions for maximization of S(0).
The welfare criterion 9(0) generally yields time—inconsistent
proqrams if the planner is constrained only by the initial capital stock
K(0) and the saving—investment relation K(t+l) —K(t)=Y[K(t))—c(t,t)
—c(t—1,t)In other words, for s ;0,the consumption plan
{c(t,t),c,t+1)) maximizing 9(0) subject to resource constraints
does not maximize B(s) if followed from time s onward. The reason for
this is that the .Bamuelson criterion does not attach an appropriate
eght to tre welfare of the old generation alive at the start of the
plan. In each periods, maximization of B(s) requires that consumption
by the old be zero, even though this was not planned when 5(s—l) was
max iniz ed
Samuelson (196) in effect avoids time inconsistency by placing an
additional constraint on the planner: the requirement that the consump—
tlDn of the old in period s, c(s—1s), be taken as given. If this
predetermined consumption level for the old is interpreted as the level
envisioned in the previous period's optimal plan, the planner is forced
to pursue a time—consistent program. However, Samuelson does not offer
this interpretation, and no suggestion is made regarding social institu-
tions that might impose a time—consistency constraint.
The welfare criterion introduced here avoids time inconsistency by
explicitly and appropriately accounting for the welfare of cohorts
already alive at the planning period's start. No dynamic—consistency
constraint is placed on the planner's actions. The social welfare func—— 10—
tion proposed in S;muel;on (1967)alsoavoid; time—inconsistency without
side constraints, but only under restrictive assumptions on individual
preference; that ;as. onie of the isuesdiscussedbelow. (Samuelson
(1967) assumes that u[c(t,t),c(t,t+1)]vCc(t,t) + vtc(t,t+l)], so
that individuals do not discount future utility.) It is noteworthy (but
not surprising) that the optimal plans explored below entail intertem—
poral and intergenerational allocation rules which generalize those
derived oy Samuelson (1967, 1968).
Our planners objective is the sum of two components. First, there
is the lifetime expected utility of the generation; to be born as
measured from the moment of birth. Second, there is the expected
utility, over the reaainder of their lifetimes, of those cohort; cur-
rently alive. The remaining expected utility of a cohort currently alive
is. like that of a cohort to be born, measured from the perspective of
its birthdate. If it is assumed in addition that the planner discounts
generation; at a rate p > 0, the social welfare function is
(14) W(0) (5uEc(v,t)]exp-ft[S+p(s-v))ds)dt)exp(-pv)dv
+ SU(.JuEc(v,t)]exp{_itEC+p(s_v)]ds)dt)exp(_pv)dv
at time t =0.W(0)hasan alternative interpretation. Its first com-
ponent may be viewed as a weighted integral of instantaneous utilities
actually enjoyed by members of future generations, discounted to the
date of birth at the "risk—free" rate S.(Recallthat there is no aq—
uncertainty.> The second component is the weighted integral of
utilite; to be enjoyed by living members of the current generations,
also discounted to their birthdates at rate C.Theplanners maximiza-
tion must be carried out subject to an initial capital endowment K(0)
and the constraint (10), which is repeated here (after substitution from(9)) for converiience
(1) DK(t) =Y[K(t)] -.ftc(v,t)expC_ftps_vds]dv.
It may appear unnatural to discount the utility of those already
alive ack to their birthdates, rather than to the present. After all,
the planner is concerned with their welfare from the present (time t =
0)onward. However, this discounting scheme is necessary for the time
consistency of optimal intertemporal allocations. Unless those alive and
those to be born are treated symmetrically, the planner has an incentive
tocha9e the consumpti on previ ously planned for unborn eneraUors once
theycome into existence.'
To appreciate the time inconsistency problem consider the




In (14' the expected utility of the surviving members of current
generations is measured from the perspective of time 0. If it isas-
sumed for simplicity that p(n) is a constant p, then for I >0,
V(0)V(T) + J1(T)+J7(T)
+ +
Anapparent alternative to (14) would treat current and future
generations symmetrically by discounting all utility back to time 0.
But this is equivalent to raising p to p +in (14).
8
As noted above, Samuelson (1967) studies the maximization of a
social welfare function similar to (14) in an overlapping—
generations model with deterministic two—period lifetimes. However,
he assumes a finite planning horizon, no individual time preference,
and no generational preference on the part oftheplanner. In
Bamuelsons framework, therefore, '= 0,which would imply no dis-
tinction between (14) and (14').—12—
where
=
(v,t) )exp[- (+p) (t-T) ]dt}exptp (v-i) ]exp (-pv) [exp (-ST) -1 3dv,
J(T)=
{fuEc(v,t))expE-(+p)(t-T)]dt}exp[p(v-T))exp(-pv){expU(v-T)]-exp(-T))dv,
={?u[c(v,t) exp[- (+p) (t-v) 3dt}exp (-pv)dv,
( T = 1{SuEc(v,t))exp[—(+p)t]dt)exp(pv)exp(—pv)dv. £ U
Thequantities ti a Q2 are predetermined as of timeT, but J1(T) and
are not. It followsthat a plan maximizingV(O)givenK(O) will
not in general maximize V(T) given the resulting K(T). The reason for
this is that any plan optimal at timemust maximize V(T) +J1(T)
÷
V(T)—— given K(T); otherwise it can be dominated by a plan
that yields the same values forK(T)Q, and 2' but a higher value for
V(T) +J1(T)
+J,(T). planner with preferences described by (14') will
therefore be time inconsistent. Prriving at T with capital K(T), he will
prefer to maximize V(T) and so will deviate from the plan that maximized
V(0)
Yet another alternative to (14), particularly appealing when the
instantaneous death probability is a constant p, is to treat all those
alive at time zero as if they had just been born i.e., as if they were
all of vintage zero. It is easily verified that this 'egalitarian"
scheme, like (14'), generally yields a time—inconsistent optimum. The
exception occurs when p =, sothat the planners objective is identi-
cal to a special case of (14), that in which consumption is optimally
equal across cohorts at any time.
The time consistency of plans maximizing W(0) subject to theconstraints can be seen by noting that for T 0
W(0) =W(T) + R,+
where
=r(5u[c(v,t>]exp{tE+p(s_v) dsidt)exp(-pv)dv,
R2 =SU(J u[c(v,t)lexp{-!tU+p(s-v) lds}dt)exp(-pv)dv.
and R.. are predetermined as of time T. It follows that any plan
maximizing W(0) iven K(0)mustmaximize W(T) given the implied value of
K(T,. Otherwise there would exist a plan yielding the same values of
KtT),R1,and R2, but a higher value of W(T) .Andthis would contradict
9 the assumed optimality of the initial plan.
An implication of our analysis is that the credibility of a plan-
ner will depend on the way he weights generations utilities. This
complication is not found in the Cass—Koopmans framework with nonover—
lapping generations. There, it is a matter of indifference whether the
planner discounts instantaneous utility according to the time at which
itisenjoyed or the generation that enjoys it. Here the distinction is
10 crucial.
It should now be clear that there is a time—consistent analogue of
the Samuelson criterion 3(0) which embodies the discounting conven-
tion incorporated in our welfare measure W(0). That criterion is
CuCc(—l,—1),c(—l,0)J/} +3(0), which is maximized at time 0 given
the (predetermined) consumption level c(—l,—1) enjoyed in their
youth by those currently old.
10
If one were to insist that optimal plans should be time consistent,
our findings would give some guidance regarding admissible social
welfare functions. This is reminiscent of Koopinans (196) discus-
sion, where its is shown that a nonnegative planner's discount rate
is required to ensure the existence of an optimal plan when popula-
tion s growing. Note that our analysis would be unchanged if the
discount rate applied by the planner to generation v at time t were
expC—p(v—t)] (as in Cass and Koopmans) rather than exp[—pv].-14—
iii. The Optimal lIocation over Tise
The intartemporal resource allocation chosen by a time—consistent
utilitarian planner is studied in this section. That optrnum is qualIta-
tivelysimilarto the one arising in the familiar Cass—Koopeans—Ramsey
qrowth problem with identical nonoverlapping generations, but here the
generational discount factor pdeterminesthe long—run marginal product
of capital, as suggested by Samuelson (1965).
It is easiest to salve the planners problem of maximizing (14)
subject to (is) by the method of optimal control (rrow and Kurz, 1970).
4fter changing the order of integration, (14) may be written in the form
l6 W(0) = ulc(v,t)]exp[-Stp(s-v)ds]exp[(S-p)v]dv}exp (-St)dt.
Equation (16) yields yet another interpretation of the planners objec-
tive. W(0)isjust the discounted integral, overallfuture dates, of a
weighted sum of instantaneous utilities of those currently alive. The
planner applies the individual subjective discount factor S in weighting
the aggregate utility enjoyed on different dates. IR adding up utilities
enjoyed on a given date by agents of different ages, vintage is dis-
counted at the net rate S -p.11
Let (t) denote the costate variable for the problem of maximizing
(16) subject to (1). Then the associated Hamiltanian is written
The criterion (16) may be viewed as a discounted sum of static
'Senthamite" social welfare functions again, see Samuelson (1967),
Observe that even if u(.) is bounded the summands in (16) can be
unbounded if the nenerational discount factor pissufficiently
large. Ingeneral,therefore, an optimal plan need not exist: one
needs to assume that the welfare weight attached to previous gener-
ations does not grow 'too quickly" relative to the rate at which
members of those generations die and S. This problem can be avoided
by postulating a finite age n such that F(n) =1.Existence of an
optimum is assumed in the discussion below.—15-
(17)Stu[v,t)Jexpt_5tp(s_v)dsexpCC_p)v]dv
+ (t){YCK(t)] - tc(v,t)expC_!tp(s_v)d5]dv].
Necessary conditions for an ptimal plan are
(18)u'(c(v,t)3expE(—p)v] =(t)
plus the equation of motion for the costate,
(19)D7(t) = (t)U —Y'[K(t)3).
Equation(18) implies that at any time t consumption evolves across
cohorts according to the equation
(.20) c(v,t)/v = —{u'Cc(v,t)3/u1tc(v,t)])( — p).
By (18) and (19), the consumption of a given cohort evolves over time
accordingto
(21) c(v,t)/t =—{u'Ec(v,t)/uEc(v,t)flCy'[K(t)]—
Whatis the meaning of equation (20)? 4s was noted earlier, the
difference —pcan be viewed as the net rate at which the planner
discounts a given cohort's welfare according to its age. if an alloca-
tion is optimal, there must be no incentive to shift consumption between
cohorts at any time t. But this implies that the rate at which the
marginal utility of consumption changes as age rises (i.e., as v falls)
must equal —p.This is what equation (20) states. The case p =
yieldsthe '1egalitarian" plan mentioned in the previous section, under
which all individuals have the same consumption level at any point in
time.
The intertemporal allocation condition (21) is identical to the
condition (8) achieved by the competitive economy. This, incidentally,—16--
can be used to show the Pareto efficiency ofthemarket allocation
since population growth is zero and the marginal product ofcapitalis
always positive). What is the rationale for (21) in a planning context?
For an agent 'of vintage v, the sum +p(t—v)is the instantaneous
expected—utility cost, at time t, ofpcstponingconsumption. If the
government shifts one unit of a given c.ohort's consumption into the
future, the instantaneous return on the investment to those left alive
is Y'EK(t))+ p(t—v)because the proceeds are divided among a smaller
group. Since the net return available to the government equals that
offered by the insurance company, the rate at which a cohorts marginal
utility changes aver time must equal +p(t—v)—Y'[K(t)]—p(t—v)=
— i'[K(t)),as in the competitive allocation.
The solution to the planning problem is quite general, in that no
special assumptions about the form of the instantaneous utility function
u(.) are required. To make the nature of the solution more transparent,
it isusefulto analyze first a special case. We then show that the main
iaplications of this special case also hold in general.
Assume temporarily that u(.) belongs to the constant relative risk
aversion class, 'so that —cu/u'R. Then conditions (20)and(21) yield
a simple characterization of the behavior of aggregate consumption C(t)
along an optimal path. Differential equation (20) now has the solution
22)c(v,t)=c(t,t)exp[U'—p)(v—t)/RJ.
Aggregate consumption at time t may therefore be expressed as
(23)C(t)=c(t,t).ItexpC_(1/R)!tU_p+Rp(s_v)lds}dv
(cf. (9)). The convergence condition iintexp{SCp__Rp(s)3ds} =0is






condition an optImal plan would not exist (see footnote 11).
Differentiationshows that the coefficient of c(t,t) in (23) is
constant cier time. Thus, aggregate consumption and the consumption of
the newly born are proportional, so that
(24> DC(t)/C(t) =Dc(t,t)/c(t,t).
Combining (21) and (22), we find that
(25> Dc(t.t)Ic(tqt) (1/R)Y'[K(t)] —P).
Epuatians(24) and (25) now show that the central planner will cause
aggregate consumption to evolve according to the rule
(26) DC(t)1C(t) =(1/R){Y'EK(t)3—p3.
Thisis identical to the condition that would govern the evolution of
aggregate consumption in the standard Cass—Koopmans—Ramsey
representative—agent planning model with discount rate p.
Equations(15) and (26) describe the aggregate dynamics implied by
utilitarian planning. These dynamics may be pictured with the aid of
figure 1. Aggregate consumption equals ouput along the UK =0locus so
the capital stock is stationary there. On the DC =0locus aggregate
consumption is stationary (although individuals consumption levels may
change over time). The system is saddlepoint stable as usual, with a
unique path 55 converging to the steady state equilibrium E*. 55 yields
the optimal initial aggregate consumption level C(0) associated with any
given initial capital stock K(0). The optimal steady—state capital stock
K* is determined by the condition
(27. Y' cK) =-18—
and thus depends only on the production function and the rate at which
the planner discounts according to age. Optimal steady—state consumption
is of course givenby
(28) C* =((K*).
It is noteworthy that condition (27) is the same as that derived by
Samuelson (1968) in a model where the planner is constrained to pursue a
time—consistent plan. Indeed conditions (20)and(21) also have
rn 4rmrwrn-L
Themain resultsof theconstant relative risk aversi on casecan
begeneralized. In particular the steady state described by (27)and
(28) is independent of the instantaneous utility function u(.), and the
consumptions of all cohorts rise or fall inonotonically along the transi—
tion path. While it is no longer possible in general to express the
economy's dynamics in terms of aggregate consumption and the capital
stocks an alternative two—variable representation can be developed.
These assertions are established as follows. Use necessary condi-
tion (18) to write c(v,t) as
(29) c(v,t)(t)exp[(p—)v]), $10.
Recallthat aggregate consumption is given by equation (9). After a
change of variables from v to n =t—v(i.e., from 'vintage' to "age")
(9) becomes
C(t) =!c(t—n,t)expC—fp(s)ds]dn,
so that upon substitution of (29) we have
(30)C(t)=4C?(t)exp[(p-)t]expt-(p-)n]}exoE-.fp(s)ds]dn.—19—
Define q(t)(t)exp[(p—)t]. Then (29) and (30)implythat aggregate
consumption can be written as a declining function of q(t), CCT)(t)].
Equation (15) may now be expressed in The form
(31) DK(t) =YEK(t)) — Ctq(t)].
Differentiation af q(t) and application of (19) show that
(32)Dq(t)=q(t)C
—Y'CK(t)]}+r(t)(p —= q(t)Cp—Y'[K(t)]}.
Equation (32) is identical to the dynamic equation for the costate
variable in the standard representative—agent model with time—preference
rate p.
Thephase diagram for the system in r?(t) andK(t> described by
enuations (31) and (32) is shown in figure 2. Because C(q*) =K*,where
q* is the steady—state value of q, aggregate consumption and the capital
stock converge toward the stationary values C* and K* defined by (27)
and (2B).Thequalitative behavior of consumption is the same as in the
constant relative risk aversion case of figure 1, both in the aggregate
and at the cohort level.
IV. Optimal Fiscal Policy
The goal of this section is to show how fiscal policy can be used
to decentralize optimal utilitarian plans in the competitive economy of
section 1. Because the competitive equilibrium without government inter-
vention is efficient1 only lump sum taxes need be used to generate the
optimal plan as a competitive equilibrium. However, the tax an in-
dividual pays will in general vary according to his age and calendar
time. To keep the analysis simple we consider only balanced—budget
fiscal policy. Equivalent policies could involve government debt issue,F'
K
S
Lbut this is not discussed explicitly below.
To make the main points it is sufficient to work with a special
case ot the model, that studied by Blancard (1985). It is therefore
assumed once aoain that the instantaneous death probability is a con-
stant p, that the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic, and
that individuals are born with human wealth only. The last paragraphs of
section I discuss individual and aggregate behavior in this case when
there is no government intervention, and the reader may wish to review
them before proceeding.
Given an initial capital stock K(O),theoptimal plan generates
paths CK(t) for capital and {C(t)}.3 for aggregate consumption.
These in turn yield paths for the shadow real interest rate r(t) =
'I'EK(t)),the shadow wage w(t) =p'YCK(t)]
—K(t>Y'CK(t)J)4and the
shadow present value of per capita wage income h(t) (given by (12), and
the same for all agents alive at time t) .Todecentralize the optimal
intertemooral allocation, the government must endow each agent at birth
with a transfer stream inducing the desired consumption levels when the
shadow price paths Cr(t)}0 and CW(t))ç3 are expected. Let T(v,t)
denote the transfer payment received by an agent of vintage v at time t,
and let b(v,t) denote the present value of these payments at time t
given the expected real—interest rate path. We will consider fiscal
policies having the property that the qovernments budget is balanced on
each date t4 so that net transfers to the public are zero:
t
L3) S (v,t)exp[—p(t—v)]dv U.
The present value of transfers faced by an agent born at time t =
Ois b(O!O) .Thatindividuals consumption is therefore
(34) c(O,O)= (I'+p) [h(O) +b(O,O)•1I-
whenu(c. log(c); and, if optimality condition (20) holds at t =0,
(35)c(v,()=(i'+p)[h(OY+k(v,0)+b(v,0)3
=(+p)[h(0) +b(0,0) ]exp[ (—p)v).
Sinceaggregateconsumptionat t =0must equal the optimal level C(0)
integrationof (35)overthe population leads to
(35) b(0,0) =CU+p—p)/(+p) 3C(0) —h(O)
Equation 35)impliesthat the transfer streams of those born before t =
0have present values given by
(37) b(v,0) Ch(0) +b(0,0)3expE(-p)v]
-h(0) - k(v,0).
Afterthe transfer streams for those alive at t =0are announced
by the government, its only remaining choice variables are the transfer
payments to be made to those born on subsequent dates. Suppose these are
chosen in such a way that the budget is balanced on each date (i.e.
(33)holds)and
(38) b(t,t) =Eh t: + b(00) Jexp{Str (s) -p]ds} - h Ct).
The resulting competitive equilibrium willthenreplicate the optimal
plan.
Toverify this result, it must be shown that the implied cohort
consumption paths satisfy (20) and (21). (We have already seen that the
correct initial consumption levels will prevail.) By the individual's
Euler equation (8), it will automatically be the case that for tv ￿
(39) c(v,t) =c(v,v>exptttCr(s)-flds,where c(vv) =(&+p)Eh(v)+b(v,v)].It therefore follows from (38)that
(40) c(v,t) (+p)Eh(0) +b(0,0)3exp(r[r(s)-)dsexpE(-p)v].
In the case v < 0, (37) implies that (40) holds for all t ￿ 0. Equations
(20) and (21) follow immediately upon differentiation of (40).
For the sake of intuition, it is useful to analyze the balanced—
budget fiscal policythat supports the steadystate pictured in figure 1
asa competitive equilibrium. ssume, therefore, that the capital stock
is initially at the level K* defined by equation (27).
Let us first ask why K* would generally not be a steady—state
equilibrium without government intervention. To be concrete, take the
case Y' (K*) =p=&. Ifthe interest rate and the wage were expected to
remain constant atand w* foreverq each agent in a new cohort would be
born with total (human) wealth
(41) h(t) =w*I(+p) = p(Y(K*)—
(by(12)) and his lifetime consumption path would be flat atthe level
p[Y(K*)
—Y'(K*)K*].Asymptotically aggregate consumption would clearly
approach labor's share in national output; and because labor's share is
less than total output, this is inconsistent with goods—market equi-
librium in a steady state. In the competitive steady state, Y1(Kc) > 8.
Each cohort's consumption thus rises over time (by (8)) so that ag-
gregate consumption equals the lower level of national output.
Return now to the decentralization problem. Since we are assuming
a steady state, the payment received by an individual depends on age t—v
only, and so may be written as T(t—v). The present value of these pay-
ments given the expected path of the real interest rate, b(v,t), may be
written as b(t—v) in the present context. It is assumed as before thatn 7- -J
theqovernments budget is balanced. This condition is now written
(42) 5t7(t_v)expE_p(t_v)]dv 0
To support the optimal steady state associated with p as an equi—
librium, fiscal policy must confront each agent with a transfer path
inducing aggregateconsumptionequalto Y(K*) when theinterest rate is
expected to remain at Y'(K*) p -forever Let k(t—v) denote the capital
held by an agent of age t—v (of course k(0) =0).Since all agents have
thesame wage income the consumptIona-f anindivi dual aged t—v is
(43) c(t—v)p(+p)CY(K*)Y'(K*)K*]/(p+p) + (+p)Ck(t—v) +
where
(44) b(t-v) = S7(s-v)exp[-(p+p)(s-t)]ds.
Integrating(43)over the entire population, we find that aggregate
consumptionis
(45)C(t)('+p) [Y(K*)—V'(K*)K*lIcp+p)
+ (+p) {K* + ftb (t-v)exp[-p (t-v) ]dv3-.





To make sense of the implied fiscal policy we need to interpret the
left—hand side of (46). 4fter hanqing the order of integration, this




The left—handside of(47)is just a weighted sum ofthetransfer pay-
ments madeateach age n. The weiht given to (n) is in turn a sum,
each term ofwhichequals the number of agents in a cohort of age n—s (s
0) times the discount factor each applies to 'r(n).Bythe government
budget constraint (42) (46) and (47) can be combined to yield a formula
giving the optimal present value of government transfers at birth
(48) S3T(n)expC-(p+p>nldn=£pp!(p+p))K*
-
Anytransfer path C,r(n)}W0thatsimultaneously satisfies (42) and
(48)willinduce a level of aggregate consumption that is constant at
Y(K*i. in general, many such paths exist. Before concluding that the
problem of decentralizing the steady state has been solved, it is neces-
sary to check the optimality condition (20> governing the allocation of
consumption among contemporary cohorts. But by the individual Euler
condition (8)
(49) c(t—y)/t =c(t—v)EY'(K*) —
Condition(20>followsimmediately from the observations that c/t =
—c!ivin a steady state and that Y'(K*) =p.
Equation (48) allows us to determine whether a newborn agent's
discounted lifetime transfers b(0) will be positive or negative under
optimal fiscal policy. Direct calculation shows that
(50)b(0> 0 as p .+ p(+p)[K*IY(K*)].
By (13), however, the steady—state real interest rate in the absence of
fiscal intervention is V' (KC) =+ p(+p) [Kd/Y(Kc)]. It follows from
(50)thatthe government must set b(0) positive if it wishes to maintaina stationary capital stock K* greater than the laissez—faire level
and must set b(O) negative in the opposite case. In other words, addi—
tional capital accumulation require negative (unfunded) social
security, an unsurprising result in view ofthoseobtained by Diamond
(1965).Facedat birth with a declining path of transfer payments, each
agent accumulates capital so as to smooth his consumption. By setting
the path of transfers according to (48) the government can equate
aggregate saving to zero.
The foregoing results are underlined by considernq again the
special case p ='. Underthis temporary assumption, (48) reduces to
(51> b(O) ipK*/(&'+p) =pY' (K*)K*/(&+p).
Equation (51) states that the transfer system endows each agent at birth
with the per capita present discounted value of capital's share in
national income so that, by (41), a(O) =h(O)+b(O)=pY(K*)/U+p).
Individual consumption is flat at pY(K*) ,anda declining path of trans-
fers induces a flow demand for capital just equal to flow supply "be-
queathed to the economy by those who die.
V. Conclusion
This paper has studied the problen of time—consistent utilitarian
planning in an economy where individual lifetimes are stochastic.
dynamically consistent optimal allocation is characterized by a general-
ized version ofSamuelson's(1968) 'two—part golden rule". However, the
economy's aggregate dynamics are quite similar to those arising in the
planning models of Cass (1965), Koopmans (1965), and Ramsey (1928)
which postulate homogeneous nonoverlapping generations. Through ap-
propriate lump—sum transfers, the optimal allocation can be realized asthe equilibrium of a competitive economy with actuarially fair an-
nuities.
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